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" I do not know why Aristotle should not hold a dog responsible for
biting.... Moreover, he explicitly connects voluntariness with praise and
blame, and it is agreed that if he really means to withhold responsibility
183
from animals, this is at any rate nowhere explicit."
184
Nowhere in Book III, chapters 1-5 of the Nicomachean Ethics
(hereinafter "Ethics" or "EN") does there appear a term which could
unequivocally be translated as "moral responsibility."1 85 Nonetheless,
there is widespread agreement among students of Aristotle's Ethics that
these chapters contain Aristotle's account of moral responsibility.
Why? Although Ethics Book III begins with a discussion of acting
voluntarily (hekousios), this is evidently in service of Aristotle's larger
discussion of virtue.1 86 Clearly, one's actions will not count as virtuous if
they are not performed voluntarily, nor are such actions to be praised
(or vicious ones blamed). Since we also tend to think that candidates for
praise and blame are morally responsible for what they do, there is some
reason to think that Aristotle's account of the voluntary is meant to
serve as his theory of moral responsibility, without which the Ethics
would be incomplete. Having supposed that this is Aristotle's theory of
moral responsibility, several critics go on to argue that his account is
inept because it implies a contradiction, that it is deficient for failing to
justify ascriptions of responsibility and in properly identifying
candidates for moral responsibility. Alternatively, critics argue that his
conception of moral responsibility does not correspond to modern

182. For helpful criticism of previous versions of this paper, I am grateful to Rfldiger Bittner, David

Copp, Dan Devereux, John Simmons, and audiences at Bowling Green State University and the
University of Richmond, Symposium on "Humans and Other Animals".
. University of Richmond
183. RIcHARD SORABJL ANIMALS, MINDS AND HUMAN MORALS 111 (Cornell University Press, 1993).
184. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett, 1985). Aristotle's
Nicomachean Ethics consists often Books divided into chapters. References to this work will be cited
to the page in Terence Irwin's translation that also refers to the pagination of Immanuel Bekker's
edition of the Greek text (Berlin, 1831).
185. Aristotle does use the adjective aitios, which may be appropriately translated as "responsible,"
"cause," or "to blame," but he does not modify aitios with any word corresponding to "moral." See id. at
1111a29, 1113b23-1113b25, 1113b30-1113b32.
186. See id. at Book III, ch. 1.
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notions of moral responsibility. None of these critics' attempts to
resolve the difficulties in Aristotle's discussion is ultimately successful
(though many provide clues as to how we should understand the text in
question). In this article, I propose a way of reading the text that has
both interpretive and philosophical merits. It is a more straightforward
and literal reading of the text, requiring less interpolation than
alternative readings. It also attributes to Aristotle a theory of moral
responsibility which is, if not correct, at least as worthy of attention as
many of the contemporary theories under debate. My own view is that
the objections raised miss their target not because they fail to voice
legitimate concerns about an adequate theory of moral responsibility, but
because what Aristotle offers in the text in question (especially in Ethics
Book III 1-2) is an account of the proper expression of praise and
blame, and not a theory of moral responsibility.
Ethics III, chapters 1-5 appears to express or imply the following
theses:
(A)
(B)
(A)
(C)

We are morally responsible for all voluntary actions.
Children and nonhuman animals act voluntarily.
and (B) imply (C):
Children and nonhuman animals are morally responsible.

Yet Aristotle seems also to believe:
(D) Children and nonhuman animals are not morally responsible.
There seems to be a blatant contradiction in Aristotle's account of
moral responsibility, but to simply accept this would be ungenerous. A
variety of scholars have suggested that by taking a broader view of the
Ethics, we may find in it a more philosophically plausible theory of
moral responsibility.
Can a more plausible position be developed for Aristotle, given the
text with which we have to work? Here are the options that have been
defended:
Amend (A) by showing that the only ones responsible for voluntary
acts are normal adult human beings.
Deny (B). Accept voluntariness as a necessary and sufficient
condition for responsibility, but deny that children and nonhuman
animals act voluntarily in the relevant sense.
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Supplement (A) by claiming that we are responsible for a larger class
187
of actions than just the voluntary.
Affirm (A), but claim that what Aristotle means by "responsible" is
not what we mean, so that it no longer seems antithetical to our
conception of morality.
Deny that (A) is Aristotle's view; reinterpret the text to show that
voluntariness is often of interest in assessing responsibility, but is a
precondition only for praise and blame.
Deny (C). Is there any reason to suppose that this interpretation of
Aristotle's theory of moral responsibility is restricted to persons?188
After all, if the conditions for voluntariness are met - namely, that the
origin of action is internal to the agent and these are the necessary and
sufficient conditions for moral responsibility - why not consider whether
the theory might extend to nonhuman animals, who may also be
thought to originate actions?
Richard Sorabji does just this, he observes that Aristotle holds that
animals act voluntarily and that voluntariness implies liability to praise
and blame, or in other words, as he claims, implies moral
responsibility. 1 89 Sorabji takes his interpretation of Aristotle (which
yields a view that he seems to find independently plausible) to be at odds
with those interpreters who hold that Aristotle denies responsibility to

187. This suggestion does not resolve the aforementioned contradiction. It does, however, make an
important contribution to our understanding of Aristotle's views about the voluntary, and how they
relate to moral responsibility. Its importance will become apparent in what follows.
188. Irwin holds that the contradiction should not be resolved by denying (D) even though he admits
that he does not know where Aristotle explicitly affirms it. Still, Irwin's belief is not arbitrary. Aristotle
"... clearly assumes that animals and children are not to be subject to legal and moral sanctions."
Terence Irwin, Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 125 (Amelie
Oksenberg Rorty ed., 1980). He never suggests any radical extension of the recognized class of
responsible agents. Irwin proposes to reject (C) and to accept Aristotle's definition of the voluntary, but
he aims to show that Aristotle could, on his own terms, justify restricting responsibility to normal adults.
See strategy (1), suprapage 3. If successful, Irwin claims this would yield a genuinely Aristotelian and
philosophically respectable theory of moral responsibility.
Two points should be made in response to this approach; they are related. As Irwin formulates the
problem, he does not distinguish between praise and blame on the one hand, and moral responsibility
on the other. This conflation saddles Aristotle with a contradiction he does not commit. That is, Irwin
would find no contradiction in Aristotle's text if he had made this distinction. Then it would be
unproblematic to claim that "A is a proper candidate for praise and blame if and only if A does x
voluntarily." Second, since for Irwin voluntariness is a necessary condition for both moral
responsibility and praise and blame, in denying that voluntariness is sufficient for moral responsibility,
he must also be denying that voluntariness is necessary for praise and blame, but Irwin has no
apparent reason for denying this other than to render Aristotle consistent.
189. See SORABmi, supra note 2.
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animals. The source of Sorabji's disagreement, as he understands it, is
that other interpreters believe Aristotle's conception of the voluntary
to be more complex and, in particular, to require a role for reason. If
reason is required for voluntary action, then clearly only humans can be
morally responsible, since Aristotle explicitly denies reason to
nonhuman animals.
I think Sorabji's interpretation of Aristotle on this point is incorrect,
but for different reasons than are advanced by the interpreters he
challenges, and for reasons which I think can help bring into view the
role of animals in today's communities. Sorabji thinks that the claim
that animals, in acting voluntarily, are liable to praise and blame is
indistinguishable from the claim that animals are morally responsible.
Indeed this seems to him so obvious that he does not offer any
justification for it. However, Sorabji's view is false. From the fact that
something is liable to praise or blame, it does not follow that it is
morally responsible. Nor does Aristotle make this mistake. I will defend
this view in Sections II and III. Before turning to that argument,
however, I will briefly examine the other suggested interpretive
strategies.
The first strategy aims to show that children and nonhuman animals
do not act voluntarily in the sense relevant to moral responsibility. For
purposes of this paper, it will be sufficient to mention two difficulties
with this approach. First, it involves ignoring, or at least not taking very
seriously, Aristotle's explicit assertion that children and nonhuman
animals act voluntarily. 190 Second, there is good reason to suppose that
(at least sometimes) children and nonhuman animals do act voluntarily.
If they did not, it would be senseless to try to modify their behavior
through expressions of praise and blame. 191 But we (moderns) 192 do
praise and blame them, and sometimes, we suppose, to good effect.
Defenders of this view may overlook this fact, mistakenly assuming that
praising and blaming, and holding others responsible are the very same
practice, even though they are logically distinct. Accordingly, it is
possible for children and nonhuman animals to engage in voluntary
behaviors while not being morally responsible just in case it can be
190. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at lllb9 ("For children and the other animals share in what is
voluntary .... ).
191. This point is also made by Jean Roberts. Jean Roberts, Aristotle on Responsibilityfor Action and
Character,9 ANCIENT PHIL. 23, 25-26 (1989). Further references to this article will be contained in
the text.
192. Throughout this paper, the term "we" is used to denote people in modem society.
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reasonable to praise and blame those who are not morally responsible.
Acknowledging that children and nonhuman animals engage in
voluntary behaviors, but may not be morally responsible, shows that
voluntariness is not a sufficient condition for moral responsibility. What
is less frequently noted is that it is not even a necessary condition. They
are neither praiseworthy or blameworthy, nor responsible for voluntary
actions, of course, because their "... moving principle is outside, being a
principle in which nothing is contributed by the person who acts or is
acted upon," 193 or they are attributable to ignorance of the particular
circumstances of action. There is, however, in addition to voluntary and
involuntary, another class of actions which are neither voluntary nor
involuntary and which arise through a certain kind of ignorance. As
Randall Curren writes:
The kind of ignorance that makes an act involuntary must be
ignorance that originates outside of the agent, for otherwise the act does
have its origin and cause in the agent. Yet voluntariness requires
knowledge of the circumstances (EN 111 1a22-24), so that when an act
is done in ignorance of the circumstances of the action, and that
ignorance is the agent's own fault, then responsibility arises because the
act and the resulting harm have their source and cause in the agent, even
194
though the act is not voluntary.
The point of this article is to articulate the distinguishing criteria of a
class of action for which we are culpably ignorant, about which it might
be said "he should have known better," that is, when the ignorance is the
agent's own fault. The law classifies such actions as negligent. When a
person acts negligently, he does not act with the intention of causing
harm; he does not act maliciously. Nonetheless, the person should have
foreseen the harm as likely, and a reasonable person - one who does not
have a defective character-would have foreseen the harm as likely, and
consequently refrained from causing it. 1 95 That Aristotle distinguishes a

193. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 1110al-1110a3.
194. Randall R. Curren, The Contribution of Nicomachean Ethics iii 5 to Aristotle's Theory of

Responsibility, 6 HST.PHIL. Q. 265 (1989).
195. Aristotle's view, according to Curren is, "that if an agent causes harm without choosing to do so
[non-maliciously], but does so in a way that reflects and springs from a defective character, then the
agent may be regarded as the source and cause of the harm, and so responsible for it, since we may
regard character and the conception of ends belonging to it as the originating seat of agency." Id. at
265. It seems to me, as I will argue in the text, that the agents conception of ends is largely irrelevant
to his negligence. Rather, the agents character is defective because he fails to consider the likely
effects of his actions. The defect, in my view, is a defect of practical reason.
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class of negligent action shows that he viewed this aspect of
responsibility in much the same way as contemporary Anglo-American
legal systems. We can be responsible (culpable) for harms caused
unintentionally or not voluntarily. Voluntariness is neither a necessary
nor sufficient condition for responsibility, since we are justified in
holding responsible those who, in causing harm, do so because of a
culpable defect in their understanding of what they must do.
The preceding discussion showed that we should not deny (B) - that
children and nonhuman animals have a share in the voluntary, and that
voluntariness is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for
responsibility. But this does not foreclose the logical possibility that
children and nonhuman animals may be morally responsible, and it was
this concept that was found troubling. We need to turn now to what is
perhaps the boldest suggestion of how we should understand Aristotle's
views (strategy (4) above). That is, accept (A), (B), and their logical
implication (C), but let us not be disturbed; let us instead suppose that
Aristotle means something different than we do by "responsibility", so
that holding children and nonhuman animals morally responsible
becomes more palatable. What may initially recommend this approach
is that it involves relatively little in the way of interpretive gymnastics.
We need not supply an account of specifically moral responsibility, and,
since Aristotle never explicitly claims that children and nonhuman
animals are not responsible, we need not be concerned that he
contradicts himself on this point. Still, I think this strategy amounts to
throwing the baby out with the bath water, and that there remains a
philosophically plausible interpretation of Aristotle's text - strategy(5)
above, which I defend in what follows. In order to see this, it will be
helpful both to have in mind Aristotle's larger project in the
Nicomachean Ethics, and to carefully consider the proposal that
Aristotle's conception of moral responsibility does not correspond to
the modern view of this issue.
I.
By the end of Ethics II, Aristotle is prepared to identify the domain
of virtue, that is, to take note of those qualities of actions that are
indicative of a virtuous character. It is important to keep in mind that it
is character that is most properly said to be virtuous; actions are truly
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(that is, not coincidentally) virtuous when they are performed in a way

that a virtuous agent would perform them. 196 This is to say that actions
are, typically, signs of and caused by character (and so are said to be

expressions of virtue in a derivative sense), and that character is the seat
of virtue.
In order to display the virtuous character, Aristotle needs to give an

account of how a person with a virtuous character acts. His point in
Book III, chapters 1-5 is not to say what specifically makes action x an
instance of virtue y - this is covered in part by the doctrine of the mean
in Book II and the later discussion of the individual virtues in Book III,
chapters 6-12. The idea is rather to identify which qualities any action

must possess in order to be a candidate for virtuous action. It is with this
in mind that Aristotle begins his discussion of the voluntary, but the
voluntary is only the broadest category into which an action must fall in

order to count as possibly virtuous; involuntary actions are neither signs
of, nor caused by virtuous character. In order to be a sign of virtue or

vice, an action must possess (or lack) a variety of other characteristics.
Yet, as Aristotle's discussion reveals, we have other interests in people's
behavior besides an interest in their virtue. A person's actions still affect
others, independent of whether the person is virtuous, vicious, or

neither, and we may want to change their behavior, even if we cannot
reform their character.
The actions of the virtuous person express his character, who he is.
This is a premise, rather than the conclusion of an argument. 197 In other
words, Aristotle does not first develop a theory of moral responsibility

in order to conclude that a person can be virtuous only on account of
the actions for which he is responsible. Aristotle assumes that for the
most part, we can respond to and judge people on the basis of their

196. "Since it is possible to do injustice without thereby being unjust, what sort of injustice must
someone do to be unjust by having one of the different types of injustice, e.g. as a thief or adulterer or
brigand. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 1134b30; "For when someone inflicts these harms [actions
caused by natural or necessary human emotions] and commits these errors, he does injustice and these
are acts of injustice; but he is not thereby unjust or wicked, since it is not vice that causes him to inflict
harm." Id. at 1134b22-1134b24.
197. "But for actions expressing virtue to be done temperately or justly [and hence well] it does not
suffice that they are themselves in the right state. Rather, the agent must also be in the right state when
he does them. First, he must know [that he is dong virtuous actions]; second, he must decide on them,
and decide on them for themselves; and third, he must do them from a firm and unchanging
state... Hence actions are called just or temperate when they are the sort that a just or temperate
person would do. But the just and temperate person is not the one who [merely] does these action, but
the one who also does them in the way in which just and temperate people do them." ARISTOTLE,
supranote 3, at 1104b30-1105b9.
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actions precisely because actions are reflections of the state of the
agent's soul.
Of course, it is not always true that a person's deeds are an accurate
reflection of his character. Sometimes we are forced to do things we do
not want to do, sometimes we make mistakes or have accidents,
sometimes we are virtuous or vicious only coincidentally. In all of these
cases if the outcome from the agent's point of view is not what is wished
for, then he may plead that what was accomplished was not truly his
end. He might say 'I didn't mean to', 'I hadn't realized', 'I didn't
know', or 'I couldn't help it'. In these sorts of cases, we suspend a
variety of judgements and reactions we ordinarily make or have because,
while the agent's actions normally reflect his character, the action in
question is aberrant, and so one for which he ought not (does not
deserve) to be judged harshly (or well). Actions that are not referable to
the agent's character are not the proper object of moral evaluation. 198
Aristotle's discussion of the voluntary in Ethics III.i is largely a
discussion of what is not voluntary, 199 it is primarily concerned with
exculpatory claims. 200 But from what exactly do such claims exculpate?
Suppose I break my promise to take you to the train because I was
kidnapped. When I later explain to you why I broke my promise, I will
hope that my explanation (which takes the form of 'I was forced not to
keep it; I couldn't help it') will (1) keep you from being or feeling angry
with me; (2) convince you not to blame or find fault with me for my
failure; (3) persuade you not to resent my failing; and (4) give you
reason not to judge me a bad person. Of course these reactions are all
related, but they are nonetheless distinguishable. Indeed the discussion
running through Ethics Book VI, culminating in an account of complete
virtue, employs these distinctions, though not as systematically as we
20 1
might like.
The absence of a clear and systematic account of the distinctions
between these reactions is, in one sense, a virtue of Aristotle's account.

198. I will argue that it is for this reason that very young children and nonhuman animals are not the
proper object of moral evaluation, namely, that they cannot yet be said to have characters.
199. Among actions that are not voluntary, Aristotle distinguishes between "mixed actions," see
ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 1110a5-1110a20, "non-voluntary actions," see id. at l10b19 -1110b25,
and "involuntary actions," see id. at 1110b31-111 a2.
200. Involuntary actions correspond to excuses which take the form "I couldn't help it," while nonvoluntary actions correspond to excuses which have the form "I didn't know." See ARISTOTLE, supra
note 3, at 1110al-lll0a4, 1111a2-111a21 (exculpatory claims).
201. See TROELS ENBERG-PEDERSEN, ARISTOTLE'S THEORY OF MORAL INSIGHT 256-60 (1983).
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His discussion is premised throughout on how we actually interact with
one another, what we say to each other, how we feel, what we can and
cannot accept (and while there are standard reactions, often our
reactions are nuanced so as to respond to the particulars of the case). It
is largely a descriptive account, with occasional explanations and
justifications of our reactions, rather than a prescriptive account of how
we ought to react to others. For this reason, Aristotle can provide a
more-or-less detailed picture of the landscape, but it would be
inappropriate - it would not fit the subject matter - to erect a structure
into which our various responses should fit.
The responses in question - anger, resentment, blame, judgment of
vice - may appear to be linked together by the notion of responsibility.
That is, they are each ways of holding others responsible. But failure to
distinguish between these various responses has led some interpreters of
Aristotle to allow just one of the responses to dictate the whole of a
theory of moral responsibility. Once this mistake is made, it is only a
short step to the claim that Aristotle's conception of moral
responsibility does not correspond to modern notions. To show that
view to be false, I will need to show why one who acts voluntarily is not,
in Aristotle's view, thereby morally responsible. It is to that task that I
shall now turn.
II.
An important component of Aristotle's theory of virtue is his
account of the conditions under which praise and blame are appropriate.
It is with these concerns in mind that he embarks on his discussion of
voluntary action in Book III 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics. One recent
critic, Jean Roberts, equating his theory of voluntary action with his
theory of moral responsibility, goes on to argue that Aristotle holds a
theory of moral responsibility that is alien to our modern conception of
responsibility. I will argue, by contrast, (a) that more careful analysis
indicates that Aristotle's theory of the voluntary is not coextensive
with his theory of moral responsibility, (b) that in fact, what Aristotle
offers in the text in question is best understood as a theory of praise and
blame, rather than a theory of moral responsibility, and (c) that as a
result we need not dismiss Aristotle's theory of responsibility as
inconsistent with modern views.
The idea that Aristotle's theory of the voluntary is identical to his
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theory of moral responsibility takes root in the assumption that when
Aristotle marks off voluntary actions as those for which the agent is
liable to praise or blame, 20 2 he is both equating praiseworthiness and
blameworthiness with moral responsibility, and that Aristotle is prepared
to deliver his theory of moral responsibility. Roberts' understanding of
Aristotle's argument can be roughly summarized as follows:
We are not responsible for actions performed involuntarily.
We are praised and blamed (i.e., responsible) for all and only
voluntary actions.
We are praised and blamed (hence morally responsible) only for
actions referable to the agent's changeable desires.
Children and nonhuman animals act from changeable desires.
Children and nonhuman animals are praised and blamed.
Therefore children and nonhuman animals are morally responsible.
We (moderns) do not think children and nonhuman animals are
morally responsible.
Therefore, if Aristotle thinks children and nonhuman animals are
morally responsible, then he must have an alien conception of moral
responsibility.
The argument, as I have crudely summarized it, serves more than one
purpose. It points to an explanation of why we hold responsible only
those who act voluntarily. It does this by offering a partial analysis of
what is distinctive about voluntary action, showing (in broad outline)
why voluntariness is a necessary and sufficient condition for praise and
blame. It also shows why Aristotle's theory of moral responsibility is
alien to our modern notion. As I have already suggested, I think the
conclusion of this argument is false. It is false not only because it begins
with a false premise, but also because the analysis of the voluntary is
mistaken. The assumption that a theory of praise and blame is the same
as a theory of moral responsibility is suspect. Since an analysis of the
conditions for the former are not necessarily applicable to the latter
more argument is needed. Furthermore, the analysis of the voluntary is
misleading both because it fails to adequately distinguish between actions

202. "Virtue, then, is about feelings and actions. These receive praise or blame when they are
voluntary, but pardon, sometimes even pity, when they are involuntary." ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at
1109b30-1110a4.
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that are not involuntary and those that are voluntary, and because it
does not accord a sufficiently prominent role to the cognitive aspects of
full voluntariness. I will comment on both problems in order to reveal
two substantive philosophical points, namely, that there is good reason
to distinguish between a theory of praise and blame and a theory of
moral responsibility, and that the real force of Roberts' argument is to
raise the question why we do not (generally speaking) hold morally
responsible those who do not act voluntarily.
It is clear from Aristotle's discussion that he believes we neither
praise nor blame actions which come about through force. 20 3 Also
excluded from the class of the voluntary are actions that are due to
certain kinds of ignorance (note that this feature is shared by
contemporary theories of responsibility). Ignorance of the particular
circumstances often makes an action involuntary, while ignorance of the
20 4
universal (namely, the good) does not make an action involuntary.
The condition of voluntariness or involuntariness of action is
important for Aristotle because it concerns the explanation of what
happened, and Roberts makes her case by focusing on the importance of
appropriate explanation for justified ascriptions of responsibility. What
is distinctive about her interpretation of Aristotle is both the claim that
appropriate explanations centrally refer to desires of the agent that are,
in principle, changeable, and that the reason the presence of these
desires justify ascriptions of responsibility is that behaviors caused by
205
changeable desires can itself be modified.
An adequate explanation for what happened includes centrally the
cause of what happened. Causal explanation figures prominently in our
imputations of moral responsibility because we do not hold morally

203. He writes "What comes about through force or because of ignorance seems to be involuntary.
What is forced has an external origin, the sort of origin in which the agent or victim contributes
nothing -- if, e.g., a wind or human beings who control him were to carry him off." ARISTOTLE, supra
note 3,at1110al-1110a5.
204. See id.
atI10b35-1111a22.
205. In general then, voluntary actions seem to be those which allow one to infer something about the
desires of the particular agent and for which the condition of that agents soul is the best explanation.
T.H. IRWIN, Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle, in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 122 (Amelie
Rorty ed., 1980). It is curious, as Irwin notes, that the Ethics does not actually mention the role of
desire in voluntary action. Id. at 123.
It is worth mentioning, though it is not central to my concerns here, that Roberts fails to notice the third
class of action pointed out by Curren, namely, those which are neither voluntary nor involuntary, but
for which we may be culpable.
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responsible someone who does not cause the event in question. 20 6
Roberts traces the cause of voluntary actions to a certain subset of the
agent's desires, namely, those that reveal something about the particular
agent. Explanations of actions that purport to serve as justifications for
imputations of responsibility require not only that we identify the origin
of the action (and thereby locate its cause) but also that the cause be a
free cause. This is how we are to understand the requirement that the
action reveal something about the agent.
That voluntary actions are explained by some changeable desire of
the agent is crucial in leading Roberts to conclude that Aristotle's theory
of moral responsibility is concerned solely with behavior modification.
Her analysis of voluntary actions reveals that the desires which explain
voluntary action are not, for example, a function of being a member of
a particular species; such desires are both unavoidable and
unchangeable. 207 Furthermore, such desires would not reveal anything
about the individual agent. The fact that these desires are, in principle,
changeable implies that they are specific to the individual and that the
individual need not have had the desire. 208 The result is that the action
that was caused by the desire was not necessary or unavoidable; in other
words, it was freely caused. The importance of this fact for Roberts now
becomes evident - these desires can be trained so as to produce beneficial
actions and avoid harmful ones.
Roberts thinks that we are morally responsible for all actions that are

206. Two qualifications of this claim are in order. First, the importance of causation does not extend
fully to instances of legal liability. In cases of strict or vicarious liability, a person may be held liable
and punished even though she does not cause the event in question. This indicates that in the law, at
any rate, liability to punishment does not presuppose moral responsibility in this sense. Second, I do not
mean to exclude the possibility that one may also be morally responsible for one's omissions. It has
been plausibly argued that one's failure to act may be the cause of a harm when one has a duty to
prevent that harm. JOEL FENBERG, HARM TO OTHERS 159-63 (Oxford University Press, 1984).
207. This suggests that actions that are explained by species-desires are involuntary and hence not
ones for which we are morally responsible. Absent any further qualifications, this implies, implausibly,
that the person who steals food because he is hungry does not act voluntarily and is not responsible for
what he did. Roberts, supranote 10, at 25.
208. The desire is only "in principle changeable" because there are some desires which, either
because they are cultivated or not properly trained from early on, are not in fact changeable. Aristotle
remarks "Moreover, it is unreasonable for someone doing injustice not to wish to be unjust, or for
someone doing intemperate action not to wish to be intemperate. This does not mean, however, that if
he is unjust and wishes to stop, he will stop and be just. For neither does a sick person recover his
health [simply by wishing]; nonetheless, he is sick willingly, by living incontinently and disobeying the
doctors, if that was how it happened. At that time, then, he was free not to be sick, though no longer
free once he let himself go .. " ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 1114all-1114a18. The point here is
obvious: we can be praiseworthy or blameworthy, or morally responsible for actions that result from
certain unchangeable desires, if we could have had better or worse desires through our efforts.
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caused by a trainable desire because of two passages in the Ethics 20 9 in
which Aristotle says that other animals and small children have a share
in the voluntary, "and are therefore responsible, in his sense, for some
of what they do. '210 Furthermore, we use the language of praise and
blame in our interactions with small children and animals. The family
dog is praised and rewarded for sitting on command, the small child may
be reprimanded and punished for tormenting the dog (or her little sister).
There appears to be evidence for believing that the class of voluntary
actions is coextensive with the class of actions for which we are morally
responsible, but equating the two, taken together with the belief that
small children and other animals can act voluntarily, should strike the
modern reader as odd, or so Roberts thinks. It should strike us as odd
because we think that animals and small children are not morally
responsible; we think they do not deserve to be held morally responsible
because they do not have the capacity to act responsibly.
How should this dilemma be resolved?21 1 It has been suggested that we
can remove the air of paradox simply by supposing that Aristotle means
something different by "moral responsibility" than does the modern
theorist. He is not concerned with desert; 21 2 he is concerned only with
the power of praise and blame to modify behavior. Voluntary actions are
those which could have been different, or did not have to happen - if
only the agent's desires were different. Praise and blame can, she thinks,
modify a person's desires. Roberts concludes that since liability to praise
and blame marks off those actions which are performed voluntarily, and
since we (including small children and animals) are responsible for those
actions performed voluntarily, then what Aristotle must mean in holding
someone morally responsible is that we regard him as the sort of being
who is, in principle, capable of modifying his behavior in response to

209. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 111 la25-11 1a26, 111 b8 (Terence Irwin trans., Hackett, 1985).
210. Roberts, supranote 10, at 26.
211. Irwin thinks that Aristotle shares the belief that Roberts attributes to only the modern reader.
Irwin claims that Aristotle believes the following. "A is responsible (a proper candidate for praise and
blame) for doing x if and only if A does x voluntarily. Animals and children act voluntarily. Animals
and children are not responsible for their actions." IRwiN, supra note 24, at 125. It appears then that
Aristotle's accounts of voluntary action and responsibility result in a contradiction. There is clear
textual evidence to support the first claim. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 1148b19-1148b31,
1149b22-1I50a5. Evidence for the third claim is less obvious, but, as Irwin points out, Aristotle does
assume that animals and children are not to be subject to legal and moral sanctions. Irwin identifies the
same contradiction as Roberts does, but attempts to resolve it by different means, namely, by seeing
whether Aristotle gives us reason to limit the class of voluntary actions to normal adults.
212. For a general discussion of desert-based justice see http://www.law.qut.edu.au/about/ljj/editions/
v1n1/pojman full.jsp.
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praise and blame.
III.

This argument concludes that responsibility reactions of praise and
blame are justified by the useful consequences that follow from these
reactions, but the argument relies on certain questionable assumptions
and inferences. Perhaps the most important of these assumptions is that
praise and blame are addressed exclusively to those who are morally
responsible. Are there good reasons for equating a theory of moral
responsibility with a theory of praise and blame? If these theories need
not be coextensive, we can still hold, with Aristotle, that small children
and other animals sometimes act voluntarily and that we do praise and
blame them (and may be justified in doing so), while denying the claim
that they are morally responsible. Denying that they are morally
responsible would free us from the counterintuitive conclusion that
moral responsibility reactions are best understood as attempts to modify
and regulate behavior. All we would be obliged to conclude is that, in
some cases, praise and blame are used to modify behavior. This seems
relatively uncontroversial, and embracing it would allow us to defend
Aristotle against the charge that his conception of moral responsibility
is alien to us because it is not desert-based, as modern theories of
213
responsibility are supposed to be.
The assumption that a theory of praise and blame and a theory of
moral responsibility amount to the same thing rests on a perhaps more
basic, but equally misguided assumption that Aristotle has given, in his
discussion of the voluntary, a set of necessary and sufficient conditions
for praise and blame. The behavior modification theorist needs to read
Aristotle as claiming that an action is praiseworthy or blameworthy if,
and only if, it is voluntary. 214 But this claim is highly implausible, and I
215
see no reason to ascribe it to Aristotle.

213. It is perhaps worth pointing out that, although the most popular contemporary theories of moral

responsibility justify ascriptions of responsibility on the basis of desert, there are other, e.g.,
consequentialist theories ofjustification which hold desert to be of less central importance.
214. If Roberts had recognized the third class of actions, she would not have been drawn to this
conclusion.
215. Perhaps the clearest indication that Roberts' interpretation of Aristotle's theory of moral
responsibility is too simple comes in the passage immediately following the discussion of the voluntary.
Aristotle writes 'Now that we have defined what is voluntary and what is involuntary, the next task is
to discuss decision; for decision seems to be most proper to virtue, and to distinguish characters from
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If voluntariness is a sufficient condition for praise or blame, then we
should expect people to respond to all voluntary actions with praise or
blame. But we do not always respond in this way, and for good reason. I
voluntarily brush my teeth each morning and evening because I desire
good oral hygiene. Surely my tooth-brushing is not praiseworthy (though
my young child's might be). Some voluntary actions, being trivial, are
216
neither praised nor blamed.
Not only do we refrain from praising or blaming trivial voluntary

actions, but we also do not praise or blame morally neutral voluntary
actions. 217 On any plausible conception of morality, most (or at least

many) of the actions we voluntarily perform are best understood as
morally neutral, and if we respond to them at all, it is with a morally
neutral response. My sitting down when my feet are tired is morally
neutral; under normal circumstances, so is going to the movies or eating
pasta for supper. Accordingly, such voluntary actions are neither praised
218
nor blamed.

one another better than actions do." ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 1llb5-111b7. Recall Aristotle
introduced the discussion of the voluntary as part of his theory of virtue, and referred to virtue and
vice as the objects of praise and blame. It seems reasonable to suppose that decision will help to pick
out those who should be praised and blamed for their virtue or vice - that is, those who are morally
responsible.
216. In Magna Moralia Aristotle claims: "[T]here are many acts which we do voluntarily before
thinking and deliberating about them; for instance, we sit down and stand up, and do many other things
of the same sort voluntarily, but without having thought about them...A few legislators, even, appear to
distinguish the voluntary act from the act done by choice as being something different, in making the
penalties that they appoint for voluntary acts less than for those done by choice." ARISTOTLE, THE
MAGNA MORALIA 503-504 (G. Cyril Armstrong trans., 1934). This passage was pointed out to me by
Walter Ott.
217. Acts for which one is morally responsible are those about which it makes sense to raise the
question of praise or blame, punishment or reward. John Fischer notes that "there is a conceptual
connection between moral responsibility and accessibility to activities such as reward and punishment,
but an agent can be morally responsible for an action for which he ought not be either praised or
blamed. (This sort of theory of responsibility is particularly attractive when one considers that there
are certainly cases of morally neutral actions for which an agent is nevertheless responsible.)" JOHN
MARTIN FISHER, INTRODUCTION TO MORAL RESPONSIBILITY 13 (John Martin Fisher ed., 1986). So, for

example, it is coherent to ask whether Jean Valjean should be punished for stealing a loaf of bread,
but under the circumstances, punishment may have been inappropriate. An action that is normally
considered wrong may, in certain circumstances, be justified (or at least excusable) and so neither
praiseworthy nor blameworthy. Less dramatically, many of the actions we voluntarily perform are
morally neutral - they are neither praise- nor blameworthy - but we are still responsible for doing
them.
218. One might object that these claims are true only on a conception of morality in which obligation
is the central idea. But even on Aristotle's teleological conception of morality, according to which a
person pursues (his conception of) the good, it seems implausible to suppose that a person must choose
every action in light of the good. We think a good life must include a measure of various types of
activities including, perhaps, entertainment. But that does not imply that going to any particular movie
is a good thing to do, much less a praiseworthy action.
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We can learn that a normally trivial or morally neutral action (such
as brushing my teeth or eating pasta) may not be choice worthy on a
particular occasion. So, for example, I normally brush my teeth at night
without giving it much thought. But suppose that I, along with several
other people, am lost in the desert and I choose to use the last of our
communal water supply to brush my teeth. A normally trivial action has
become, in this case, morally wrong, and for such an action I would
deserve moral censure. Similarly, if my eating pasta deprived a starving,
but equally deserving, child from eating, that too might be morally
wrong.
Aristotle clearly takes a similar view about trivial actions becoming
morally significant. We see this in his desire to remove the air of
paradox surrounding actions that do not seem entirely voluntary.
Aristotle calls these "mixed actions," 219 actions that one would not
willingly perform ordinarily, but are still choiceworthy on certain
occasions, and so are performed voluntarily. His account continues:
For such [mixed] actions people are sometimes actually praised,
whenever they endure something shameful or painful as the price of
great and fine results; and if they do the reverse, they are blamed, since
it is a base person who endures what is most shameful for nothing fine or
for only some moderately fine result. In some cases there is no praise,
but there is pardon, whenever someone does a wrong action because of
conditions of a sort that overstrain human nature, and that no one would
220
endure.
I take it that Aristotle would agree that no action, in a vacuum, is
choiceworthy. An action becomes choiceworthy, or good, because of
both the kind of act it is and the circumstances in which it is performed.
Some actions, of course, are not usually choiceworthy, such as throwing
the ship's cargo overboard. 221 By the same token, an action normally
may be morally neutral - neither choiceworthy nor "rejection-worthy" but be choiceworthy in certain circumstances. Throwing a javelin is
ordinarily a trivial and morally neutral act; the act's character changes
dramatically when its point is aimed at another's heart.
Since there clearly are voluntary actions that are neither praised nor
blamed, we should conclude that Roberts' interpretation of Aristotle as

219. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 1110a12.

220. Id.atll10a20-1110a26.
221. See id. atll10a5-1110b5.
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defining the voluntary in terms of praise and blame unnecessarily saddles
him with an implausible (and, I will argue, avoidable) position. The
examples of trivial and morally neutral actions show that voluntariness
is not sufficient for praise or blame. It may be more plausible to claim
that voluntariness is a necessary condition for praise or blame. 222 For
now we should note that even if the domain of the voluntary were
identical to the class of actions for which we are morally responsible, the
fact that a person is praised or blamed for an action is not conclusive
evidence that the person is morally responsible for that action.
IV.
Is Aristotle's discussion responsive to our pre-theoretical convictions
about the relation of the voluntary to praise and blame? And how, if at
all, are they related to his account of moral responsibility? I will argue
that we can both salvage some of Roberts' understanding of Aristotle
and make better sense of the text of Ethics 111.1 by taking a closer look
at how the language of praise and blame is used. I have already argued
that the voluntary cannot be defined in terms of praise and blame.
Nonetheless, I agree with Roberts to this extent, namely, that all actions
223
that are appropriately praised or blamed are at least not involuntary.
Our disagreement concerns reasons for praising and blaming. Once we
realize that there is more than one way to justify praising and blaming,
we will be in a position to see that only certain uses of praise and blame
presuppose moral responsibility, and that this notion of moral
responsibility is a familiar one based on desert.
Even casual observation of ordinary discourse (observation that was
equally available to Aristotle) reveals that we use the language of praise
and blame in a variety of contexts. Let's consider a simple set of
examples.
(1) Barbara is given a new puppy, Alice. Barbara adores Alice but is
dismayed that Alice frequently jumps up and knocks her down. She
decides that Alice must learn to sit when she commands her to do so.
Barbara begins to train Alice, saying "Good Alice!" when Alice sits, and
supplementing
her
praise
with
treats.

222. But even this claim is doubtful, or at least in need of qualification, given Curren's persuasive
argument that Aristotle thinks we are responsible for negligent actions.
223. I amend Roberts' language with this awkward phrase to incorporate Curren's observation.
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(2) When little Susie plays with other children, she tends to hoard her
toys. Susie's parents decide that Susie must learn to share. They
encourage Susie to share her toys by helping her to hand them over to
other children, smiling approvingly, and saying "That's great, Susie!"
when
she
does
this
herself.
(3) George is a hard-working man who is busy with his career and raising
his family. George had planned to go to the movies tonight. On his way
to the movies, he witnesses a minor car accident. George discovers that
one of the victims is a child on her way to perform in the school play.
George volunteers to drive the child to the play and forego the movie.
Afterwards, George's family and friends say "What a nice guy; that was a
really good thing to do. I doubt I would have bothered."
To blame a person for an involuntary action is both practically and
theoretically objectionable. The blame can serve no practical purpose,
since the person is unable to alter what he does, and furthermore, it is a
fundamental maxim of morality that we are not morally required to do
what we are unable to do. Therefore, in the case of involuntary action,
we withhold blame not only because it serves no useful purpose, but
because responding otherwise would be inappropriate.
The point of the preceding vignettes should be obvious. In certain
contexts, such as the first two, we use the language of praise and blame
for the purpose of modifying behavior (and in the case of young
children, to "invite" them into the moral community). We think it a
good idea for our pets and children to behave in certain ways, and we
believe that certain kinds of verbal encouragement or discouragement
will help to produce the desired outcome. 224 It is important to note that
such a belief would be irrational if the behavior in question were
involuntary. If one really cannot help but act in a certain way, then it
would be impossible for praise or blame to affect one's behavior. As
Aristotle himself notes:
For they [legislators] impose corrective treatments and penalties on
anyone who does vicious actions, unless his action is forced or caused by
ignorance that he is not responsible for; and they honor anyone who
does fine action; they assume that they will encourage the one and
restrain the other. But no one encourages us to do anything that is not

224. Although any parent of a two-year-old will know that these expressions are efficacious in only a
limited way
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up to us and voluntary; people assume it is pointless to persuade us not
to get hot or distressed or hungry or anything else of that sort, since
225
persuasion will not stop it happening to us.
In the last case, George is praised not because we want to modify his
behavior (or at least that is not our primary reason for praising him).
Rather, we praise him because he deserves our praise. He thought about
the situation, about his desire to see a movie, the child's desire to get to
the play, and the parent's consternation at being in a car accident.
While being aware that he was under no obligation to do much of
anything (since no one was hurt, or even stranded), he just thought it
would please the child to be able to get to her play. George deserves
praise because he decided to do something good beyond what minimal
duty demanded. Had George performed this same deed because he was
forced or compelled to, we would not find him praiseworthy. In other
words, voluntariness seems to be a necessary condition of praise being
226
deserved.
These simple observations suggest that the absence of involuntariness
may well be a necessary condition for praise and blame, but for two
different reasons. In the case of small children and animals,
voluntariness is a necessary condition for praise and blame because in its
absence they would be far less likely to change their behavior. If the
point of praising and blaming in these cases is only to change behavior,
the absence of voluntariness would remove any reason for praise or
227
blame.
What has not been addressed yet, but is worth noting, is how unlikely
it is that Aristotle would have thought that praising and blaming alone
were appropriate tools for the modification of normal adult behavior.
Aristotle discusses at some length official sanctions for breaking the law
that involve corrective measures, and he is particularly interested in

225. See ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 1113b23-1113b29.

226. This discussion suggests a possible asymmetry between the significance of the voluntary for
blame on the one hand, and praise on the other. Curren argued that voluntariness is not a necessary
condition for blame, according to Aristotle, because he wants to allow the possibility that a person is
responsible and blameworthy for the harm he causes negligently, and such actions are not, strictly
speaking, chosen or voluntary. See Curren, supra note 13, at 266. Aristotle can view negligence as
blameworthy because the ignorance that is the source of the harm is the agents own fault. But it seems
less likely that a person is praiseworthy for achieving a good consequence when he is ignorant that his
act will achieve some good, and the ignorance is his own "fault."
227. Of course this leaves open the possibility that children might deserve praise or blame. The extent
to which they are deserve it depends on the development of their moral character, and what it would
be reasonable to expect of them.

Richmond Journal of Law and the PublicInterest

Winter 2003

those who are ignorant of the law:
Indeed legislators also impose corrective treatments for the ignorance
itself, if the person seems to be responsible for the ignorance. A drunk,
e.g. pays a double penalty; for the origin is in him, since he controls
whether he gets drunk, and his getting drunk is responsible for his
ignorance. They also impose corrective treatment on someone who
[does a vicious action] in ignorance of some provision of the law he is
required [to know]. And they impose it in other cases likewise for any
other ignorance that seems to be caused by the agent's inattention; they
assume it is up to him not to be ignorant, since he controls whether he
228
pays attention.
Blaming or penalizing an adult, in many circumstances, may fail to
alter his behavior, because the person may have reasons for what he does
that make it worth suffering the pain of censure. We frequently see this
in the legal arena when large corporations are willing to absorb the cost
of lawsuits (without altering their practices) as part of the cost of doing
business. To penalize ignorance and inattentiveness has, however, a
different goal. It aims at getting people to think about what is expected
of them, their responsibilities, as reasoning members of the moral
community. Only through reasoning can adults change their behavior in
a reliable way that is productive of virtue.
We see now that in the case of normal adult action, the absence of
involuntariness is a condition for both praise and blame and moral
responsibility. The class of voluntary actions is wider than the class of
actions for which we are praised or blamed, and both wider and narrower
than the class of actions for which we are morally responsible.
This discussion puts us in a position to see why Roberts is mistaken in
supposing that, according to Aristotle, one who performs an action
voluntarily is morally responsible for that action. 229 Voluntariness is not
a sufficient condition for moral responsibility, while it is necessary for
many cases of praise and blame. 230 Praise and blame are appropriately
used only in circumstances in which it is possible for its recipient to alter
her behavior or when it is deserved. Very small children and animals alter
their behavior not in response to reasons, but in response to pleasure and

228. ARISTOTLE, supra note 3, at 1114b30-1114a3.

229. Roberts, supranote 10, at 26.
230. Apart from the class of action that Curren identifies, see Curren, supra note 13, at 273, but
Roberts fails to notice, voluntariness seems to be a necessary condition for moral responsibility.
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pain. This is why it can be effective to praise or blame children and
animals. But to say it is effective is not to say that it is deserved. Praise
and blame are deserved for those actions which are performed
voluntarily by those who are actually moved by a deliberative argument
and by those whose actions are inexcusable.231 This is to say that,
according to Aristotle, praise and blame are deserved by those who are
morally responsible for their actions. This conception of responsibility
seems not at all alien to moderns.
V.
Because Aristotle believed that expressions of praise and blame are
not tantamount to holding an actor responsible for what he does, it is
unlikely that Aristotle thought nonhuman animals responsible for what
they do, even though we express our approval and disapproval of their
behavior and they may act voluntarily. Voluntariness by itself gives no
real insight into whether imputations of moral responsibility are
appropriate. One reason Aristotle might have held such a view is that
whether an actor is held morally responsible depends, in part, on the
context in which he acts. For example, agents are not rightly held
morally responsible when the context of the relationship is one of
enforced submission. We may express approval or disapproval of the
actions of those whom we dominate, but in doing so, we aim only at
manipulating their behavior, rather than imputing moral responsibility.
We would not be justified in imputing moral blame for their actions that
fail to meet our standards, since imputation of moral responsibility
requires mutual acknowledgment of shared standards. Aristotle
recognized that those who are regarded as merely subject to our will animals, slaves, mere objects - cannot at the same time be regarded as
232
equals, as subject to the same standards in the same way that we are.
231. This last condition would include those who are culpably ignorant of particular features of

circumstances. See Curren, supranote 13, at 266.
232. Sorabji, in fact, observes that Aristotle realizes we have an interest simply in how the actions of
others affect us. SORABJI, supra note 2, at 154. He points to a passage in The Politics, ARISTOTLE, THE
POLITICS (Canes Lord trans., Univ. Chi. Press 1984), that gives rationale for Aristotle's for a "just war
against wild beasts." Aristotle writes:
Now if nature makes nothing incomplete, and nothing in vain, the inference must be that she has made
all animals for the sake of man. And so, from one point of view, the art of war is a natural art of
acquisition, for the art of acquisition includes hunting, an art which we ought to practise against wild
beasts, and against men who, though intended by nature to be governed, will not submit; for war of
such a kind is naturally just.
ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS 1256b20-1256b26 (Carnes Lord trans., University of Chicago Press 1984)
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When the structure of a relationship is limited to control and
233
submission, there is no place for moral responsibility.
However, the enforced imbalance of power is only part of the
explanation of why animals cannot be morally responsible. What
ultimately makes ascriptions of moral responsibility to animals
unjustifiable is their lack of reason. A full treatment of the relation of
reason to moral responsibility is beyond the scope of this essay; I will
only gesture at why the absence of reason makes moral responsibility
impossible. First, it must be made clear what is not meant by reason in
this context. It is not the ability to figure out how to get what one
wants; clearly many animals are capable of means-end reasoning. Nor do
we mean the related capacity for communication; birds have ways of
communicating warnings to one another; dogs can make their need to go
outside apparent to their owners. We might even attribute to some
animals the ability to weigh reasons, for example, they can delay
gratification of some current desire in order to secure a larger payoff
later. However, none of these reasoning abilities, which simply involve
reactions to circumstances, are sufficient to ground ascriptions of moral
responsibility.
Reason may also function in an evaluative capacity, and in exercising
this capacity, an agent indicates his understanding of what he does. Since
an actor's understanding of the quality of his actions is a central factor
in deserving to be held responsible, the absence of the ability to
appreciate the quality of one's actions would seem to render the question
of moral responsibility moot. However, it is precisely this ability that
nonhuman animals lack. While nonhuman animals may take reasons for
doing something to be stronger or weaker, they do not understand

This passage indicates that it is not because wild beasts voluntarily act badly that we are justified in
hunting them; they do not deserve to be killed for what they have done. Rather, it is acceptable to kill
them, in Aristotle's view, because of our human needs, for both food and safety. Now if it is morally
permissible to treat nonhuman animals not according to what they deserve, but according to human
interests, why should we suppose that, when it comes to praising and blaming nonhuman animals, we

must responding to what they deserve, hence holding them morally responsible? Sorabji does not
address this question directly, but merely affirms his own view that finding animals morally responsible
is
as
viable
a
position
for
Aristotle
as
its
opposite.
The issue of how the Greeks treated slaves is somewhat more complicated. Those who were regarded
as "natural slaves" would necessarily be regarded (at least partly) as inferior. Those who became

slaves as a result of being captured in war need not be regarded in this light.
233. It might also be thought that, to the extent that the law is regarded "simply as a system of stimuli
goading the individual by its threats into conformity . . ." that it too leaves no room for moral
responsibility for those who are subject to it. H.L.A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 44

(1968).
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reasons to be better or worse, good or bad. They do not have the ability
to evaluate a proposed course of action under the guise of the good.
Accordingly, even a trained dog cannot decide not to gratify a current
desire or urge because he believes it would not be good to indulge it.
Nonhuman animals cannot act on what they regard as good reasons, not
express their evaluative stance through action, but can only reveal their
training or instincts. Absent the possibility of offering reasons that refer
to the good, an actor cannot be a candidate for moral responsibility.
For helpful criticism of previous versions of this paper, I am grateful
to Rildiger Bittner, David Copp, Dan Devereux, John Simmons, and
audiences at Bowling Green State University and the University of
Richmond,
Symposium
on
"Humans
and
Other
Animals."
RICHARD SORABJI, ANIMALS, MINDS AND HUMAN MORALS 111
(Cornell
University
Press,
1993).
ARISTOTLE,

NICOMACHEAN

ETHICS

(Terence Irwin trans., Hackett,

1985). Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics consists of ten Books divided
into chapters. References to this work will be cited to the page in
Terence Irwin's translation that also refers to the pagination of
Immanuel Bekker's edition of the Greek text (Berlin, 1831).
Aristotle does use the adjective aitios, which may be appropriately
translated as "responsible," "cause," or "to blame," but he does not
modify aitios with any word corresponding to "moral." See id. at
111 la29,
1113b23-1113b25,
1113b30-1113b32.
See
id.
at
Book
III,
ch.
1.
This suggestion does not resolve the aforementioned contradiction. It
does, however, make an important contribution to our understanding of
Aristotle's views about the voluntary, and how they relate to moral
responsibility. Its importance will become apparent in what follows.
Irwin holds that the contradiction should not be resolved by denying (D)
even though he admits that he does not know where Aristotle explicitly
affirms it. Still, Irwin's belief is not arbitrary. Aristotle "... clearly
assumes that animals and children are not to be subject to legal and
moral sanctions." Terence Irwin, Reason and Responsibility in Aristotle,

in ESSAYS ON ARISTOTLE'S ETHICS 125 (Amelie Oksenberg Rorty ed.,
1980). He never suggests any radical extension of the recognized class of
responsible agents. Irwin proposes to reject (C) and to accept Aristotle's
definition of the voluntary, but he aims to show that Aristotle could, on
his own terms, justify restricting responsibility to normal adults. See
strategy (1), supra page 3. If successful, Irwin claims this would yield a
genuinely Aristotelian and philosophically respectable theory of moral
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responsibility.
Two points should be made in response to this approach; they are
related. As Irwin formulates the problem, he does not distinguish
between praise and blame on the one hand, and moral responsibility on
the other. This conflation saddles Aristotle with a contradiction he does
not commit. That is, Irwin would find no contradiction in Aristotle's
text if he had made this distinction. Then it would be unproblematic to
claim that "A is a proper candidate for praise and blame if and only if A
does x voluntarily." Second, since for Irwin voluntariness is a necessary
condition for both moral responsibility and praise and blame, in denying
that voluntariness is sufficient for moral responsibility, he must also be
denying that voluntariness is necessary for praise and blame, but Irwin
has no apparent reason for denying this other than to render Aristotle
consistent.
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